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ABSTRACT 
The Auditor General plays a key role in the constitutional framework 
that is designed to support good governance. This article critically 
reviews the constitutional position of the Auditor General. It assesses 
the extent to which, in practice, office-holders enjoy the necessary 
individual and institutional independence and security of tenure to 
enable them to carry out their constitutional mandate, especially in the 
face of efforts by some political leaders and senior public officials 
(‘politically exposed persons’ (PEPs)) to abuse their position through 
acts of corruption and misuse of public office. It also explores the 
effectiveness of the support and accountability mechanisms for 
Auditors General.  In doing so, the article reviews the position of the 
Auditor General in the constitutions of a number of Anglophone 
African states. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 The constitution is the supreme law of a state
3
 and as a former 
Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Ismail Mohammed, once observed, it 
is not simply a document which mechanically defines the structures of 
government and the relations between the government and the 
governed, but it is:  
 ‘[A] mirror reflecting the national soul, the identification of the 
ideals and aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values 
binding its people and disciplining its government’.4 
The words ‘disciplining its government’ emphasise that whilst 
constitutional office holders enjoy significant powers and privileges, they 
are bound to act in accordance with its ‘good governance’ values that 
include integrity, transparency and accountability.
5
  
 The legislature traditionally plays an oversight role over the 
executive in such matters. In reality this has proved of limited value, not 
least due to the dominance of the ruling party in many countries. Thus 
modern constitutions now often enshrine a range of independent 
watchdog bodies each enjoying a distinct mandate designed to secure 
good governance. For example, offices of the ombudsman investigate 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Article 10 of the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance which provides that ‘State Parties shall 
entrench the principle of the supremacy of the constitution in the 
political organization of the State’. 
4
 State v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 805 (Nm) at 813 A-B. See also the 
comments of the Supreme Court of Ghana in Taffour v Attorney 
General (1980) GLR 637 at 647-648. 
5
 See, for example, Article 10 Constitution of Kenya and the Preamble 
to the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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complaints from members of the public into alleged maladministration 
by public officials, anti-corruption commissions work to prevent 
corruption in the public service whilst human rights commissions 
provide a vehicle for individuals to seek redress against public officials 
for a breach of their constitutional rights. Added to this list is the 
Auditor General whose constitutional mandate is to audit and to report 
annually to the legislature on the use of public funds. 
 Including the Auditor General in this framework of ‘state 
institutions supporting constitutional democracy’6 emphasises that this 
is not an isolated and somewhat remote office but part of a scheme that 
is designed to ensure that the good governance values enshrined in the 
constitution apply to the daily administration of the country at all levels.  
In essence, such institutions form an additional branch of government.  
This article critically reviews the constitutional position of the 
Auditor General. It assesses the extent to which, in practice, the office-
holders enjoy the necessary individual and institutional independence 
and security of tenure to enable them to carry out their constitutional 
mandate, especially in the face of efforts by some political leaders and 
senior public officials (hereinafter ‘politically exposed persons’7 (PEPs)) 
to abuse their position through acts of corruption and misuse of public 
office. It also explores the effectiveness of the support and 
accountability mechanisms for Auditors General.  In doing so, the 
                                                 
6
 A phrase used to describe such institutions in Chapter 9 of the 
Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
7
 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘PEPs’ refers to ‘individuals 
who are or have been entrusted domestically with prominent public 
functions, for example Heads of State or of government, senior 
politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior 
executives of state owned corporations, important political party 
officials’: see Financial Action Task Force International Standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (2012) Glossary. 
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article reviews the position of the Auditor General in the constitutions 
of a number of Anglophone African states (collectively referred to as 
the ‘Constitutions’).8 These have been chosen as most are based on 
the Westminster export model constitution and, although much 
amended or replaced, still share a similar structure. 
The article is divided into the following parts. Part 1 explores the 
constitutional role of the Auditor General in maintaining transparency 
and accountability in public finances whilst Part 2 considers the basic 
provisions for developing an effective auditing role. Part 3 and 4 then 
analyse the constitutional provisions in support of individual and 
institutional autonomy of the office and office-holder. Part 5 examines 
the mechanisms to support and oversee the work of the Auditor-
General whilst Part 6 assesses the constitutional provisions for the 
removal of the Auditor General. Part 7 then provides a conclusion. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 Examples are drawn from Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, it is not the 
intention of the article to consider the constitutional position of the 
Auditor General in each jurisdiction. 
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PART 1: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL IN 
MAINTAINING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC 
FINANCES  
i) The challenge of PEPs 
The history of corruption and the looting of state assets by 
African PEPs is a long and depressing one. The well-documented case 
of Sani Abacha highlights to challenge facing many states. Abacha was 
the Head of State in Nigeria (and thus a PEP) who had seized power in 
a military coup in 1993. Between 1992 and 1998 he and his family 
accumulated wealth at an extraordinary rate, including extracting huge 
sums from the Central Bank of Nigeria by raising a series of demands 
for funds to meet spurious national security needs.
9
 Frederick Chiluba, 
the then President of Zambia, later used the same ‘national security’ 
tactic to loot state funds.
10
 Other well-known cases involve theft of 
state development funds by Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, a former state 
governor of Bayelsa State in Nigeria,
11
 the inflation of the price of 
government contracts by Mahmoud Thiam, a former Minister of Mines 
in Guinea
12
 and the widespread abuse of public funds by Teodoro 
Obiang, the son of the President of Equatorial Guinea.  As a result, 
                                                 
9
 Much of the activity of the Abacha family members is described in the 
case of Companie Naga d’Importation SA v Australia and NewZealand 
Banking Group Queen’s Bench Division (Comm), 27 February 2001 
(unreported). Upheld on appeal [2003] EWCA Civ 1101.  
10
 The facts are set out in the judgment of Peter Smith J in Attorney 
General of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai [2007] EWHC 952. See also 
the discussion below.  
11
 See Nigeria v Santolina Investment Corp [2007] EWHC 3053 (QB) 
12
  The facts appear in United States of America v Thiam: Government’s 
Sentencing Memorandum, 25 August 2017: available at  
<www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa/cases/mahmoud-thiam> 
accessed 3 October 2018. 
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countless people throughout Africa have been (and remain) victims of 
a breakdown of basic infrastructure and public services. 
 There are ongoing efforts recover the proceeds of corruption 
that were laundered abroad and for their return to the victim states, 
albeit this remains work in progress. Whilst such efforts are laudable, 
less attention has been paid to preventing such criminality by PEPs in 
the ‘victim’ states themselves. What is striking about each of the above 
cases is the seeming lack of any accountability of the PEPs for their 
actions due to the failure of (or lack of) effective constitutional 
accountability mechanisms. This is not surprising given that PEPs are 
the most powerful political individuals in any state and can ‘control the 
controls’. For example, by preventing, or undermining, domestic 
investigations into corruption and money laundering and controlling 
the operation of international cooperation mechanisms designed to 
trace the proceeds of corruption.
13
 They are often assisted in their 
criminality by powerful banking and other financial institutions 
through which the proceeds of corruption are laundered as well as by 
imaginative and inventive professional money launderers.
14
  
The task of preventing such criminality by PEPs is therefore a 
daunting one but the suitably adapted words of Lord Denning (quoted 
above) suggest how this can be done: ‘Be you ever so high, the 
Constitution is above you’. Thus the challenge is to develop and 
maintain effective constitutional accountability mechanisms that are 
capable of holding PEPs to account for their use (or abuse) of public 
finances. This is the onerous and challenging role played by the 
Auditor General.  
 
                                                 
13
 John Hatchard Combating Corruption: Legal Approaches to 
Supporting Good Governance and Integrity in Africa Edward Elgar, 
2014, 279 et seq. 
14
 See generally the report by the Financial Action Task Force 
Professional Money Laundering (FATF 2018).   
  
7 
 
ii) The ‘ally of the people’ 
Article 10 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC) emphasises the need for each State Party to take the 
necessary measures ‘in accordance with the fundamental principles of 
its domestic law’, to ‘enhance transparency in its public 
administration, including with regard to its organisation, functioning 
and decision-making processes, where appropriate’. This includes 
taking steps to ensure fiscal integrity, transparency and accountability 
in government and the public service.  Further the UNCAC Conference of 
States Parties (the CoSP) has acknowledged that ‘efficient, accountable 
and transparent service delivery is one of the key components in 
building an anti-corruption environment in the public sector’.15 The key 
role played by Auditors General in enhancing this goal is echoed in 
Article IX of the Commonwealth Principles
16
 which were endorsed by 
Commonwealth Heads of Government in 2003.   
As Yilmaz and Beris have pointed out, accountability addresses a 
number of elements including providing for transparency in the use of 
public funds and public accessibility to such information.
17
 However, the 
key to accountability is ‘control’.  This requires an independent audit 
                                                 
15
 CoSP Resolution 6/6 of 2015 Follow-up to the Marrakech declaration 
on the prevention of corruption, (2015) Preamble. All the African states 
discussed in this article are state parties to the UNCAC. 
16
 Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Accountability of 
and Relationship between the Three Branches of Government. Article 
IX states ‘Independent bodies such as … Auditors General … and 
similar oversight institutions can play a key role in enhancing public 
awareness of good governance and rule of law issues’. 
17
 Serder Yilmaz and Yakup Beris ‘Good Governance and the Emergence 
of a New Accountability Agenda’ in Gabor Peteri (ed) Finding the 
Money: Public Accountability and Service Efficiency through Fiscal 
Transparency (Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 
Open Society Initiative, 2008) 30. 
  
8 
 
body or bodies to ensure fiscal integrity i.e. that the powers of such 
office-holders are not abused or misused and that there is accountability 
for retaining ‘sound and transparent public expenditure and financial 
management systems’.18 This has the dual purpose of both encouraging 
‘ethical behaviour by making unethical behaviour hard to accomplish 
and easy to detect’ and helping to bring to light any abuse of power.19  
The position of Auditor General is enshrined in all the 
Constitutions
20
 and as the supreme audit authority, the office-holder 
has responsibility for auditing on an annual basis the accounts of all 
government and other state institutions,
21
 publishing an annual report 
and submitting this to the legislature for scrutiny and debate. Thus the 
office-holder is the key constitutional figure in overseeing the proper 
use of public resources and, if necessary, of publicly exposing any 
abuse of public funds. This role is neatly explained in Transparency 
International (TI Kenya) v Attorney General:
22
  
‘… the Auditor General is an ally of the people. While Parliament 
is the peoples’ representative, the Auditor General provides 
Parliament with accurate and independently derived audit 
information on state organs and public bodies expenditure [and] 
thus ensures that there is public sector accountability’.23 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Thus a statutory provision referring to the Auditor General as the 
‘statutory’ head of the office violates the Constitution: see the TI case, 
note 1 at para 83. 
21
 See, for example Article 226(3) Constitution of Kenya. 
22
 Note 1 at para 5. The case is considered in detail below. 
23
 In the case of Re the Matter of the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission of Kenya [2011] eKLR, the Supreme Court of 
Kenya also helpfully described independent Commissions and bodies 
such as the Office of the Auditor General as ‘people’s watchdogs’ (para 
59). 
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The effective performance of this responsibility is neatly highlighted in 
two cases. In 2017 a report by the Zambian Auditor General alleged 
that officials in the Ministry of Education had diverted donor funds 
provided for poverty alleviation projects into off-shore bank accounts 
through the use of shell companies. This revelation led to the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Finland and Sweden suspending aid for the project 
to Zambia whilst a number of senior PEPs were dismissed by the 
Zambian President, Edgar Lungu.
24
   
In 2013, forensic investigations by Malawi’s Auditor-General 
uncovered the fact that significant amounts of government money had 
been misappropriated by a number of PEPs in what became known as 
the ‘Cashgate scandal’. This quickly led to a major investigation (which 
is ongoing) which revealed that ‘some highly and strategically placed 
politicians and public/civil servants conspired to defraud the 
Government of Malawi of large sums of money’.25 As Mr Justice 
Kapindu neatly put it: 
‘In September 2013, gates to what was meant to be a 
clandestine and non-detectable criminal syndicate of fraudsters 
and money launderers were flung open. Information revealing an 
unprecedented fiscal scandal gradually unfolded in a manner an 
unsuspecting observer would have been forgiven to think was a 
masterfully scripted piece of fiction. It was a shocking reality. 
Billions of Kwacha had been embezzled from the national fiscus 
by some unscrupulous people’.26 
 
  
                                                 
24
 BBC news report dated 18 September 2018.  
25
 Republic v Lutepo [2015] MWHC 491 per Kapindu, J at para 7 (High 
Court of Malawi). 
26
 Ibid at para 1. 
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PART 2: TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE AUDITING ROLE  
Requiring Auditors General to ‘exercise their powers and 
perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice’ is a 
constitutional imperative.
27
 Yet the Zambian and Malawian cases 
illustrate the point made by the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
that the work of the Auditor General ‘inherently entails the 
investigation of sensitive and potentially embarrassing affairs of 
government’,28 and those of PEPs in particular. In order to enable 
Auditors General to carry out their constitutional role of effective 
public sector auditing, eight Core Principles (the Core Principles) were 
recognised in the Mexico Declaration on Supreme Audit Authority 
Independence (the Mexico Declaration).
29
 These covers issues relating 
to independence, security of tenure, investigative powers, and 
unrestricted access to information. These Core Principles are noted 
throughout this article.
30
 
 
i) Establishing and maintaining an independent office 
Core Principle 2 states that the independence of the Auditor 
General is an essential requirement for proper public sector auditing. 
This emphasises the fundamental requirement of enshrining the 
independence of the office and office holder in the constitution and is 
discussed in Part 4 below.  
 
                                                 
27
 Constitution of South Africa 1996, Article 181(2). 
28
 Quoting from the cases of Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) 
BCLR 1253 (CC) (First Certification) at para 163. 
29
 Agreed at the XIX Congress of the International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Authorities (INTOSAI). The African Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions collaborates with the INTOSAI.  
30
 See the Appendix for the complete list. 
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ii) Providing ‘a sufficiently broad mandate’31 
In carrying out their constitutional role effectively, Auditors-
General must be empowered to audit all state bodies or public entities. 
In some constitutions, the specific bodies and entities are listed.
32
 For 
example, the Article 187(2) of the Constitution of Ghana provides: 
‘The public accounts of Ghana and of all public offices, including 
the courts, the central and local government administrations, of 
the Universities and public institutions of like nature, of any 
public corporation or other body or organisation established by 
an Act of Parliament shall be audited and reported on by the 
Auditor-General’. 
Similarly, Article 188(1) of the Constitution of South Africa provides:  
‘The Auditor-General must audit and report on the accounts, 
financial statements and financial management of (a) all national 
and provincial state departments and administrations; (b) all 
municipalities; and (c) any other institution or accounting entity 
required by national or provincial legislation to be audited by 
the Auditor-General’. 
A key to a successful audit is unrestricted access to all relevant 
documentation or premises.
33
 This is emphasised in Article 187(3) of 
the Constitution of Ghana: 
‘… the Auditor-General or any person authorised or appointed 
for the purpose by the Auditor-General shall have access to all 
books, records, returns and other documents relating or 
relevant to those accounts’. 
Access to sensitive ‘national security’ information provides a particular 
challenge for, as noted earlier, there are several examples where PEPs 
                                                 
31
 Core Principle 3.  
32
 For a useful discussion on the scope of the Auditor General’s powers 
see Khumalo v Auditor General [2013] SZHC 56 (High Court of 
Swaziland). 
33
 Core Principle 4 refers to ‘unrestricted access to information’. 
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have stolen state assets under the cover of spurious ‘national security’ 
needs. This focuses attention on the extent to which Auditors General 
enjoy in practice the ‘unrestricted access to information’ required for 
carrying out their functions,
34
 including that relating to expenditure on 
‘national security’. This was the focus in the High Court of Kenya case 
of Transparency International (TI Kenya) v Attorney General (the TI 
case).
35
 
 
iii) The TI case 
In this important case, the petitioners submitted that a number 
of sections of the Public Audit Act 2015 (PAA) were unconstitutional 
both in purpose and effect as they tended to ‘interfere with the 
independence and mandate of the Auditor General, an independent 
constitutional office’.36 The Constitution of Kenya provides, amongst 
other things, that the Auditor General is ‘subject only to the 
Constitution and the law and independent and not subject to direction 
or control by any person or authority’.37 Further, that in carrying 
his/her constitutional mandate the ‘Auditor-General may audit and 
report on the accounts of any entity that is funded from public funds’ 
(my emphasis) and ‘An audit report shall confirm whether or not public 
money has been applied lawfully and in an effective way’.38 
One provision of the PAA that was challenged was section 40. 
Mwita J noted the section required the Auditor General ‘to hold a pre-
audit meeting at the highest level to agree on areas to audit and the 
appropriate audit approach when auditing national security organs and 
even allows the vetting of officers to conduct the audit’.39 In addition, 
                                                 
34
 Core Principle 4. 
35
 Petition 388 of 2016; [2018] eKLR. 
36
 Para 77. 
37
 Article 249(2). 
38
 Article 229(5) and (6). 
39
 Para 118.  
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he noted that section 42 of the PAA barred the Auditor General from 
questioning government policy objectives during audits.  
In an impressive and thoughtful judgment, Mwita J declared 
these sections unconstitutional. Having discussed the constitutional 
provisions relating to the independence of the Auditor General he 
continued: 
‘Flowing from the exposition above, it leaves no doubt on the 
unconstitutionality of sections 40 and 42 of the Act…. The 
Auditor General has a constitutional obligation under Article 
229(4)(h) to audit and report on the accounts of state organs 
public bodies and any entity funded by public money. This 
cannot be done if the Auditor General has to seek permission by 
holding meetings with higher authorities as proposed by section 
40 before carrying out the audit.  Subjecting officers to vetting 
before audit would leave room for state organs and public 
bodies to decide who to audit them’.  
As regards the limitations imposed in section 42, as Mwita J explained: 
‘The Auditor General cannot also confirm the viability of the 
policy objectives funded by the people of Kenya when section 42 
suggests that he should not question policy objectives funded 
by the people. This has the effect of stifling his independence. A 
statute cannot seek to impose conditions on the Auditor 
General’s audit approaches when the Constitution gives him 
mandate to do his work without direction or control from any 
person or authority. This violates national values and principles 
of governance including integrity, transparency and 
accountability in Article 10 and financial openness in Article 201 
of the Constitution’ (my emphasis).40 
                                                 
40
 Paras 118 and 119. Article 10 of the Constitution of Kenya states: 
‘The national values and principles of governance in this Article bind 
all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons’ when 
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It followed that the wide constitutional mandate of the Auditor 
General, included the right to scrutinise spending by all entities that 
were publicly funded and this included the National Intelligence 
Service, the Kenya Defence Force and the National Police Service.  
Given the vast sums of money lost by states when national 
security becomes a veil for corrupt activity by PEPs, requiring 
transparency in spending on ‘national security’ is a milestone in 
seeking to address such criminality.
41
 Understandably public 
confidence and trust in national security financing requires an 
appropriate balance between secrecy and transparency. This 
emphasises the importance of having a demonstrably independent 
appointee holding the office of Auditor General. 
The case also emphasises the supremacy of the constitution. 
Thus any attempt to undermine or restrict the constitutional role and 
powers of the Auditor General by legislation must be declared 
unconstitutional.  It also recognises the role of the Auditor General as 
the ‘ally of the people’ and emphasises the role of the office-holder as 
an independent watchdog body. Further it demonstrates the role of 
civil society organisations in supporting and publicising the work such 
constitutional bodies. It is of interest that the locus standi of the 
petitioners in the TI case was not raised.  
In Attorney General for Zambia v Meer Care and Desai
42
  Peter 
Smith J in the High Court of England and Wales was satisfied that the 
                                                                                                                                            
carrying out their public functions. These include ‘good governance, 
integrity, transparency and accountability’. 
41
 For a helpful discussion on this area see Transparency International 
(UK) report ‘Out of the Shadows: Promoting Openness and 
Accountability in the Global Defence Industry’ (2016). Available at 
<https://ti-defence.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Out_of_the_Shadows_WEB3.pdf>  accessed 
25 October 2018. 
42
 See note 10 above. 
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Auditor General in Zambia had the power to scrutinise defence 
procurement contracts. The position in the other African jurisdictions 
is not clear. Perhaps it is time for the civil society organisations in 
those jurisdictions to follow the lead of TI Kenya and test the matter in 
the courts. 
 
PART 3: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF 
INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY I: THE 
APPOINTMENT PROCESS  
As with other oversight bodies, it is essential that the 
appointment of the Auditor General is made through a demonstrably 
fair and transparent procedure. This is essentially a confidence-
building exercise for government, public officials, citizens, civil society 
and donors alike in the integrity, independence and competence of the 
appointee. Whilst considerable attention has been paid in modern 
constitutions to the appointment process of members of other 
oversight bodies, the position of the Auditor General often remains 
unsatisfactory. There are three key issues here: i) the qualifications for 
appointment; ii) the nomination process; and iii) the appointment 
process itself. 
 
i) Qualifications for appointment 
 Curiously, few of the Constitutions lay down any specific 
qualifications for appointment. In South Africa the Auditor-General 
must be ‘… a fit and proper person to hold that office. Specialised 
knowledge of, or experience in, auditing, state finances and public 
administration must be given due regard in appointing the Auditor-
General’.43 More specifically, in Kenya the Auditor-General must ‘have 
extensive knowledge of public finance or at least ten years’ experience 
                                                 
43
 Section 193(3). 
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in auditing or public finance management’.44 Such a background is 
surely a prerequisite for any such appointment. 
 
ii) Nominating the candidate for appointment 
In most of the Constitutions it is the President who has the sole 
power to nominate the candidate.
45
 There is no justification for this 
position for it does not bring with it any confidence in the 
independence of the president’s choice. A preferable approach is for 
the nomination to emanate from a separate body. This is the position 
in Nigeria
46
 and Namibia
47
 where the recommendation for appointment 
is made by the Federal Civil Service Commission and Public Service 
Commission respectively. Of course, it is raises the question as to the 
independence of the Commissions themselves. Thus in Nigeria the 
Commission comprises a Chairman and not more than fifteen other 
members, who ‘shall, in the opinion of the President, be persons of 
unquestionable integrity and sound political judgment’.48 In Namibia 
there is a stronger formulation. The Public Service Commission 
consists of a ‘chairperson and not less than three nor more than six 
other persons nominated by the President and appointed by the 
National Assembly by resolution’. It ‘shall be independent and act 
                                                 
44
 Constitution of Kenya, Article 229(2). 
45
 It is recognised that separate legislation may make provision for the 
selection process but it is argued that the appointment process is so 
fundamental that it must be enshrined in the Constitution to avoid any 
weakening of the procedure by subsequent legislation. 
46
 Constitution of Nigeria, Section 86(1); Constitution of Namibia, 
Article 127(1). 
47
 Constitution of Namibia, Article 32(3)(i). 
48
 Constitution of Nigeria, 3
rd
 Schedule para 10. 
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impartially’.49 There is no provision for any public involvement in the 
nomination process. 
 
iii) The appointment process 
The Constitutions contain a variety of procedures concerning the 
appointment process albeit with the legislature being involved in most 
jurisdictions.
50
 The most common procedure is for the President to 
appoint the Auditor General ‘with the approval of the legislature’51 or 
‘subject to ratification’ by the legislature.52 This is a weak approach for 
the President is able to hand-pick their chosen candidate and then 
have the (normally) cooperative legislature rubber-stamp the 
appointment by a simple majority. A stronger formulation is found in 
the Constitution of Malawi which provides that the appointment must 
be confirmed by the National Assembly by a majority of the members 
present and voting.
53
  
In South Africa the support of at least 60% of the members of 
the National Assembly is required.
54
 The rationale for such a 
requirement was noted by Mogoeng CJ in the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa in Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others:  
                                                 
49
 Constitution of Namibia, Article 112(3). There is also a concern that 
the bodies making the recommendation are themselves subject to 
scrutiny by the Auditor General. 
50
 In Ghana, Article 70(1) of the Constitution provides: ‘The President 
shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State, appoint … the 
Auditor-General’. Given the presidential influence over the Council, 
this does not hold out strong hopes of an independent assessment of 
the matter. 
51
 For example, in Namibia, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Kenya.  
52
 For example, in Zambia.  
53
 Section 184(1). 
54
 Article 193(5). 
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‘… in the case of the Public Protector and Auditor-General the 
Constitution goes further, requiring that the recommendation be 
approved by a supermajority. These are the two institutions of 
accountability whose gaze … is fixed firmly on the political 
branches; their task “inherently entails investigation of sensitive 
and potentially embarrassing affairs of government”55’.56 
In Nigeria the appointment is subject to confirmation by the Senate
57
 
which has the power to reject a presidential nomination.
58
  
The role of the Auditor General as the ‘ally of the people’ raises 
the issue of public involvement in the appointment process. 
Regrettably, the only constitution to address this point is the 
Constitution of South Africa where section 194(6) provides that the 
‘involvement of civil society in the recommendation process [for the 
appointment of the Auditor General] may be provided for as envisaged 
in section 59(1)’. Section 59(1) states that the National Assembly must 
… facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes 
of the Assembly and its committees’.  
All of the Constitutions provide that the President formally 
appoints the Auditor General. This is unexceptional. However, the 
current procedure for appointment in most constitutions arguably 
provides the president with far too much influence, especially given 
                                                 
55
 Quoting from the cases of Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (above note 28), para 163. 
56
 [2014] ZACC 32; 2015 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 159 
57
 Constitution of Nigeria, Section 86(1). 
58
 In December 2016 the Senate rejected the nomination by President 
Buhari of Ibrahim Magu as the Chairman of the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission based on an adverse ‘security report’ from the 
State Security Service. The power of the Senate to do so was upheld by 
the Abuja Federal High Court in Ojamo v Attorney General of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2018, unreported).  
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the perceived weakness of the legislature in many jurisdictions. If the 
Auditor General is to be, and be seen by the public as being, an ‘ally of 
the people’ whose mission as an independent constitutional office-
holder is to protect public finances, then there must be confidence in 
the transparency and reliability of the appointment process.  
Arguably the objective is the same as with judicial 
appointments: i.e. to appoint ‘a professionally competent person of 
proven integrity’ with candidates being drawn from as wide a pool as 
possible. It follows that restricting the nomination process to the 
President is unacceptable and that there should be an opportunity for 
the public involvement in the process.  
 
PART 4: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF 
INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY II: ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND FINANCIAL AUTONOMY 
Article 187(7) of the Constitution of Ghana neatly encapsulates 
the independence of the Auditor General:  
‘In the performance of his functions under this Constitution or 
any other law the Auditor-General … shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any other person or authority…’. 59   
The office and office-holder must therefore be entirely independent of 
government
60
 including the Public Service Commission (PSC),
61
 a key 
point as the PSC itself is subject to the audit process. 
                                                 
59
 In the TI case, Mwita J also noted that ‘as the [holder] of an 
independent office, he is subject only to the Constitution and the law 
and is not subject to direction or control of any person or authority’: at 
para 117. 
60
 The point was also emphasised by Lord Diplock in Thomas v 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [1982] AC 113 where he 
observed that the purpose of such provisions was to insulate members 
from political interference exercised directly upon them by the 
government of the day (at 124). 
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i) Financial autonomy 
Core Principle 8 states that an Auditor General requires: 
‘Financial and managerial/administrative autonomy and the availability 
of appropriate human, material and monetary resources’. This means 
that the administrative expenses of the office of the Auditor-General 
must be charged on the Consolidated Fund.
62
 It also follows that the 
recruitment of staff and other staffing matters are solely a matter for 
the office-holder and thus the Public Service Commission plays no part 
in the process. In essence ‘… the workings of the Auditor General 
including recruitment and discipline cannot be subject to the Public 
Service Commission or any other authority’ and any provision to the 
contrary violates such independence.
63
  
The importance of the point is illustrated by the fact that in 
several countries ‘advisory boards’ have been established which 
threaten this independence. For example, in Kenya, the Audit Advisory 
Board (AAB) was established by the Public Audit Act 2015, its principle 
function being to ‘advise the Auditor General on how to discharge 
his/her mandate under the Constitution’. In the TI case, Mwita J 
highlighted the independence of the Auditor General which was 
enshrined in Article 249(2) and which provided that the office holder is 
not under ‘the direction or control of any person or authority’.64 The 
role of the AAB was therefore an ‘interference with his institutional and 
individual independence’ which altered the ‘constitutional architecture 
of the independent office of the Auditor General and violated Article 
                                                                                                                                            
61
 A point specifically made in Article 127(3) of the Constitution of 
Namibia.  
62
 This includes all salaries, allowances, gratuities and pensions 
payable to or in respect of persons serving in the Audit Service: see, 
for example, Article 187(14) Constitution of Ghana. 
63
 Per Mwita J in the TI case para 88. See also his views at para101. 
64
 At para 114. 
  
21 
 
249(2).
65
 He therefore had no hesitation in declaring the provision 
inconsistent with the Constitution of Kenya. This is a most welcome 
ruling and should encourage civil society organisations in other 
jurisdictions to seek judicial review of the constitutionality of any 
domestic legislation adversely affecting the office of the Auditor 
General.  
For Ghana the matter is more complex in that the Audit Service 
Board (ASB) is established by Article 189 of the Constitution of Ghana. 
Its membership comprises (a) a chairman and four other members 
appointed by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of 
State; (b) the Auditor-General; and (c) the Head of the Civil Service or 
his representative.
66
 Its functions directly impact on the independence 
of the Auditor General. Article 189(2) and (3) provide that ‘the 
appointment of officers and other employees in the Audit Service, 
other than the Auditor-General, shall be made by the Audit Service 
Board, acting in consultation with the Public Services Commission’. 
Articles 189(2) and (3) also provide that the ASB ‘shall, acting in 
consultation with the Public Services Commission … determine the 
terms and conditions of service of officers and other employees in the 
Audit Service’. These provisions constitute a direct interference with 
the institutional and individual independence of the Auditor-General 
and are inconsistent with Article 187(7) of Constitution of Ghana which 
was noted earlier. This is another fruitful issue for a civil society 
organisation to take up in the courts. 
 
ii) Security of tenure  
Core Principle 2 states that Auditors General must enjoy security 
of tenure. Inevitably, this is linked to the term of office for the 
incumbent. Here the Constitutions vary considerably. The majority 
provide for a fixed, non-renewable term with the length varying 
                                                 
65
 At para 116. 
66
 Article 189(1). 
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between five years and twelve years. In Namibia the Auditor General 
holds office for five years but is eligible for re-appointment.
67
  
The danger of a fixed term appointment is that the experience, 
expertise and public confidence in the office-holder is likely to be lost. 
Further, given that there is no constitutional provision relating to the 
time-frame for appointment of a new office-holder, there may be a 
lengthy hiatus (deliberate or otherwise) before the new appointment is 
made by the President. This can significantly affect the operation and 
effectiveness of the office, especially where ongoing investigations 
into possible criminality by PEPs are concerned.  
The different approaches perhaps reflect the uncertainty as to 
the position of the Auditor General. In practice the Constitutions 
almost invariably provide for a fixed-term appointment to other 
‘national institutions’. Yet these are largely multi-member bodies 
where a periodic change of membership is inevitable. As the work of 
the Auditor General ‘inherently entails investigation of sensitive and 
potentially embarrassing affairs of government’ including any potential 
wrongdoing by PEPs, the office-holder is in a very different position 
from those in other national institutions.
68
  Given this reality, arguably 
the office-holder must enjoy the same terms and conditions as that of 
a senior judge. Suitable illustrations come from Nigeria where the 
position of the Auditor General is similar to that of a judge, i.e. s/he 
holds office until retiring age
69
 and from Ghana where the Auditor-
General is appointed until retirement age.
70
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 Article 127(1). 
68
 The same point applies to the appointment of the Director of an 
Anti-Corruption Commission. 
69
 Section 87(2). 
70
 Article 187(12). 
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PART 5: SUPPORTING AND OVERSEEING THE WORK OF THE 
AUDITOR-GENERAL 
The Chiluba case illustrates the failure of an Auditor General to 
perform his constitutional responsibilities. As noted earlier, the then 
President of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba and several of his close 
associates (all PEPs) looted large sums of state money under the guise 
of national security needs through what was known as the Zamtrop 
account. During the entire time the criminality was taking place, the 
Auditor General remained inactive and also failed in his constitutional 
duty to make annual reports to Parliament.
71
 As Peter Smith J explained 
in Attorney General for Zambia v Meer Care & Desai: 
‘Mr Siame, the Auditor General failed properly to exercise his 
duties or alternatively chose not to exercise the duties required 
of him probably because of the intimidatory nature of Chungu 
[Chiluba’s national security chief and co-conspirator] and the 
unwillingness of the Auditor General to challenge him and thus 
the President’.72 
As noted earlier, payments though the Zamtrop account were 
still subject to scrutiny by the Auditor General. Yet, as Peter Smith, J 
noted:  
‘There are provisions for the issue of certificates to the Auditor 
General on a quarterly basis. I observe that there were 
indications of audit approvals in the early 1990s but none has 
been discovered for the period the subject matter of this 
action...’.   
This highlights the pressure PEPs can exert on Auditors General and 
emphasises once again the significance of maintaining the 
independence of the office-holder and his/her staff. It also emphasises 
                                                 
71
 See now Constitution of Zambia, Article 121(4).  
72
 See note 10. The payments were also facilitated through the bribery 
of a senior public official in the Ministry of Finance. 
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the need to ensure that effective ‘guarding of the guards’ safeguards 
are in place.  
 
i) The role of parliament  
Reflecting Core Principle 5 i.e. the right and obligation to report 
on their work, a typical constitutional requirement is for the Auditor 
General to submit his/her report to the legislature within a specified 
time period after the end of the preceding financial year. A specialist 
multi-party public accounts committee (or equivalent) is then to review 
the report and may call any Ministers, public officials or others to 
explain any discrepancies. The annual report may be supplemented by 
ad hoc reports. The legislature is then required to debate the report of 
the Auditor General and to make recommendations or give 
instructions for follow-up action.
73
 For example, Article 229(8) of the 
Constitution of Kenya provides that ‘within three months after 
receiving an audit report, Parliament … shall debate and consider the 
report and take appropriate action’.74 Such a provision should be 
enshrined in every constitution. 
The Chiluba case illustrates the challenge of making such 
scrutiny effective in practice. The Auditor General was under a 
constitutional mandate to lay an annual report before parliament but 
never did so. Parliamentarians failed to pursue this. Thus whilst 
                                                 
73
 Core Principles 5-7 recognise i) the right and obligation of supreme 
audit authorities to report on their work; ii) the freedom both to decide 
the content and timing of audit reports and to publish and disseminate 
them; and iii) the need for effective follow-up mechanisms on their 
recommendations.   
74
 See, for example, Articles 187(5) and (6) Constitution of Ghana and 
Section 85(5) Constitution of Nigeria. Article 229(8) of the Constitution 
of Kenya provides that ‘within three months after receiving an audit 
report, Parliament … shall debate and consider the report and take 
appropriate action’. 
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constitutional safeguards did exist their failure meant that Chiluba and 
his associates were able to carry out their criminal conspiracy. In 
essence, through the intimidation or bribery of key public officials 
their criminality was hidden from view by the failure of the 
constitutional safeguards.
 75
  
 The extent to which parliamentary scrutiny is effective in 
practice is questionable. For example, a report published on behalf of 
the African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption found that 
‘too few African parliaments have effective committee systems, and it 
is rarely possible to properly scrutinise the behaviour of ministers or 
the senior civil servants who work with them’.76 This highlights two 
potential issues. First, the extent to which the appropriate expertise 
and experience is available in order for parliamentarians to assess and 
interpret the reports of the Auditor General. Second, given the reality 
of executive control over parliamentary business whether there is the 
commitment or ability on the part of parliamentarians to do so.
77
   
 It means that additional support mechanisms are required. 
 
 
                                                 
75
 For another glaring example of a failure by a parliamentary 
committee to address a corruption issue see Roger Tangri and Andrew 
Mwenda ‘Politics, donors and the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption 
institutions in Uganda’, (2006) 44(1) Journal of Modern African Studies 
101.  
76
 Joanne Davis ‘Parliamentarians and Corruption in Africa: The 
Challenge of Leadership and the Practice of Politics’ (The Parliamentary 
Centre, Ottawa, 2009). 
77
 Akech also suggests that key parliamentary committees are 
themselves implicated in corruption and therefore take no effective 
steps to address the reports of the Auditor General: see Migai Akech 
‘Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya’ (2011) 18(1) Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Issues 342 at 342. 
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ii) The role of public officials and whistleblowing 
Whilst a discussion on whistleblowing is beyond the scope of 
this article, a few comments in relation to the Auditor General are 
appropriate.  
The use of whistleblowers is a potentially vital means by which 
to break through the secrecy surrounding corruption cases involving 
PEPs. The need for states to develop effective whistleblowing schemes 
is reflected in Article 8(4) of the UNCAC which provides that each State 
Party must consider: 
‘… establishing measures and system to facilitate the reporting 
by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate 
authorities, when such acts come to their attention in the 
performance of their functions’.  
The Auditor General clearly falls into the category of an ‘appropriate 
authority’. A CoSP resolution also calls on UNCAC States Parties to 
establish ‘measures and systems to facilitate the reporting of 
incidents’ which may be considered to constitute Convention 
offences.
78
  
It is trite that corruption and abuse of office by PEPs requires the 
assistance or acquiescence of others, both within and outside the 
public service and information provided by whistleblowers is one of 
the most common ways in which instances of such criminality are 
identified.
79
 This emphasises the importance of having in place 
effective whistleblowing laws and mechanisms which facilitate 
reporting to an appropriate authority, and in particular, the Auditor 
General.  
                                                 
78
 UNCAC Conference of States Parties resolution 6/6 of 2015:  Follow-
up to the Marrakech declaration on the prevention of corruption, 
(2015) para 4.   
79
 UNODC The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Resource 
Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons  (2015) 
3 
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Arguably, this includes placing a duty on public officials to 
report corrupt practices or other misuse of office within the public 
service. This is clearly contentious, not least because of the dangers 
this may well pose to the whistleblower and his/her family. The 
argument for doing so is set out neatly in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Council of Europe Code of Conduct for public 
officials which notes that whilst this could create tensions among 
public officials, ‘the passive or tolerant attitude of public officials 
regarding breaches would be more harmful for public administration 
and society as a whole’.80    
 In fact anti-corruption legislation in South Africa already places 
a duty on any person who holds a ‘position of authority’ and who 
‘knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that any other 
person’ has committed a serious corruption offence to report the fact 
to any police official.
81
 This position is potentially complicated by state 
security legislation which criminalises the unauthorised disclosure of 
government documents/information.
82
 Given that the Auditor General 
is specifically authorised to have access to all government 
documentation, including national security information, there is no 
reason why such a reporting mechanism is not put in place.   
 
 
                                                 
80
 At para 70. 
81
 Section 34 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (No 
12 of 2004). See also section 39(1) Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Act 2007 in Tanzania. As suggested above, a requirement 
to report to the Auditor General would be more appropriate.  
82
 For example, during his investigation into the corruption by PEPs in 
Kenya in the Goldenberg affair, Justice Bosire specifically referred to 
the effect of the law and oath of secrecy on silencing public officials: 
see Republic of Kenya Report of the Judicial Commission of Enquiry 
into the Goldenberg Affair (2005) at 842. 
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iii) The role of civil society/the media 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) can play both an oversight role 
and a supportive role. 
The oversight role involves the monitoring of the work of the 
Auditor General. For example, in the Chiluba case the failure of the 
Auditor General to submit annual reports to the Zambian parliament 
and the failure of parliamentarians to address the matter represented 
a fundamental breakdown of the constitutional safeguards. By 
directing media attention to this situation CSOs would have raised 
public awareness of this failure and called for an explanation. This 
provides a ‘safe’ and constructive role for CSOs in that attention is not 
being drawn to any allegation of corruption by PEPs or a ‘cover-up’ but 
merely highlighting the constitutional responsibility of the Auditor 
General.  
Where concern arises regarding a failure to carry out the 
constitutional mandate, CSOs may also consider lodging a complaint 
with another constitutional ‘watchdog’ body. For example, in the Ouko 
case (see below), the complainant had previously lodged a series of 
complaints concerning a breach of the constitutional obligations of the 
Auditor General with the Kenya Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission.  Such a failure arguably also falls within the jurisdiction 
of the office of the ombudsman (or similar national institution) which 
has a mandate to investigate complaints of ‘maladministration’83  
Key supportive work includes undertaking public education 
initiatives to highlight the constitutional role of the Auditor-General as 
the ‘ally of the people’. Helping people to understand the 
constitutional safeguards and focusing attention on their effective 
operation (or otherwise) can arguably make a real contribution towards 
                                                 
83
 Although it is not clear in some cases as to whether the jurisdiction 
of an ombudsman is strictly limited to public officials: as has been 
noted earlier, the Auditor General is a constitutional office-holder and 
not a public official. 
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developing transparency and accountability in the management of 
public affairs. In addition, CSOs can play a useful role in assisting 
parliamentarians to understand and ensure the implementation of the 
constitutional safeguards with regard to public sector finance.
84
     
In order to assess the work of the office, public access to annual 
reports of the Auditor General is essential. In the TI case, for example, 
the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of section 72 of the PAA 
which recognised the right of public access to such reports ‘except 
where such access may unduly jeopardize state security’. It was argued 
by the petitioner that any limitation on access to the reports must 
satisfy the test for the limitation or rights and fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in the Constitution. Whilst not deciding the point, Mwita J 
noted that any ‘limitation on grounds of national security would have 
to be justified’ particularly in view of the right to freedom of 
information enshrined in Article 35 of the Constitution of Kenya.
85
 
Thus once published, reports by Auditors General become public 
documents and it was therefore the constitutional right of every citizen 
to have access to the document subject to any constitutional rather 
than statutory limitation.  
The role of the courts in supporting CSOs should not be 
overlooked. This is epitomised by the TI case in which Transparency 
                                                 
84
 Providing assistance and information to parliamentarians to help 
ensure that all constitutional safeguards are fully understood is a 
potentially important role for CSOs: see The Abuja Guidelines on the 
relationship between Parliaments, Parliamentarians and 
Commonwealth National Human Rights Institutions (2004) available at 
<https://www.agora-
parl.org/sites/default/files/guidelines_abujaworkshop.pdf> accessed 3 
October 2018. 
85
 Article 35 provides that ‘Every citizen has the right of access to 
information held by the State’ and that ‘The State shall publish and 
publicise any important information affecting the nation’. 
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International (Kenya) had locus standi (a point seemingly 
unchallenged) to lodge a petition in support of the independence of 
the Auditor General. This generous approach to standing should 
encourage other CSOs to make use of the courts to challenge any 
threats to the work of Auditors General. 
 
PART 6: REMOVING THE AUDITOR GENERAL 
i) Grounds for removal 
The grounds for removal are similar to those of a judge. For 
example the Constitution of Namibia provides: ‘The Auditor General 
may be removed from office by reason of an ‘inability to discharge the 
functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body) 
or for misconduct’.86 Similarly, in South Africa the Auditor-General may 
be removed from office only on the ground of misconduct, incapacity 
or incompetence.
87
 In Kenya Article 251(1) the grounds for removal are 
a serious violation of the Constitution or any other law; gross 
misconduct, whether in the performance of the member’s or office 
holder’s functions or otherwise; physical or mental incapacity to 
perform the functions of office; incompetence; or bankruptcy. Less 
satisfactory is the position in Nigeria where the Auditor General may 
be removed from office by the President on grounds of an ‘inability to 
discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of 
mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct’ (emphasis 
added).
88
  
 
ii) Procedure for removal  
a) Commencing the removal process  
How the removal procedure is commenced requires careful scrutiny as 
it offers a mechanism to intimidate and/or undermine the Auditor 
                                                 
86
 Article 127(4). 
87
 Section 194(1). 
88
 Section 87(1). 
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General. This is based on the fact that the Constitutions typically 
provide that the President may suspend the Auditor General from 
office after the start of the removal proceedings.  
In most of the Constitutions, parliamentarians or a 
parliamentary committee may commence an investigation. For 
example, section 184(3) of the Constitution of Malawi provides that 
the ‘Public Appointments Committee may at any time inquire as to the 
competence of the person so appointed to perform the duties of that 
office and as to the financial probity of a person so appointed, so far 
as it is relevant to the duties of that office’.  
Who else may request that the possible removal of the Auditor 
General is rarely elaborated in the Constitutions. The right of an  
individual to do so was brought into issue in the 2017 decision of the 
Kenyan High Court in Republic v Speaker of the National Assembly & 4 
others Ex-Parte Edward R.O. Ouko (the Ouko case).
89
 Here Article 
251(2) of the Constitution of Kenya specifically provides that ‘a person 
desiring the removal of [the Auditor General] on any [relevant] ground 
may present a petition to the National Assembly setting out the 
alleged facts constituting that ground’. The National Assembly must 
then consider the petition and, if it is satisfied that it discloses a 
ground for removal must send the petition to the President. The 
President may then suspend the Auditor General pending the outcome 
of the complaint.  
The case raises several issues of general concern. First, the 
complaint was submitted to the National Assembly by a petitioner, 
who was the legal representative of an undisclosed complainant who 
sought the removal of Mr Ouko. The prospect of a series of such 
petitions being presented to the National Assembly by any number of 
anonymous individuals is clearly of practical concern, particularly when 
dealing with them is liable to distract the Auditor General and can be 
used by political enemies or disgruntled individuals to undermine the 
                                                 
89
 [2017] eKLR. 
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work of the office-holder. In the case itself, the anonymous 
complainant had made a series of complaints concerning Mr Ouko, 
some of which fell within the scope of Article 251. However, these had 
already been referred to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
and the Director of Public Prosecutions whose investigations had 
vindicated Mr Ouko. In essence the petitioner was ‘forum shopping’. 
Second, the procedure adopted by Parliament was questionable. 
Here the petitioner was permitted to give unsworn testimony before a 
parliamentary committee and this was heard without the applicant, Mr 
Ouko, being given any prior notice of the hearing nor afforded a 
chance to cross-examine the petitioner. Further the applicant had not 
been informed of the precise nature of the allegations against him nor 
given sufficient time to address them. Whilst not disputing the right of 
parliament to deal with the matter and to regulate its own procedures, 
the applicant argued that there was procedural unfairness in the 
manner in which the parliamentary committee approached the matter. 
Odunga J upheld this argument pointing out that any such action must 
be constitutional and lawful. Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya 
specifically provided: ‘Every person has the right to administrative 
action …’. He therefore held, correctly it is argued, that the Article 
required a court to look both at the merits and legality of an 
administrative decision and at the process and procedure adopted.
90
  
Further he said even at common law fairness in administrative action 
was paramount.
91
  
This point raises a broader question concerning the separation 
of powers and the right of the courts to question the parliamentary 
                                                 
90
 At para 118. In doing so, he referred with approval to the decision of 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Republic of South Africa v 
South African Rugby Football Union 2000(1) SA 1 paras 135-136 which 
applied section 33 of the Constitution of South Africa which was in 
similar terms to the Kenyan provision.  
91
 Ibid at para 79. 
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proceedings. The Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles 
emphasise: ‘Parliamentarians must be able to carry out their legislative 
and constitutional functions in accordance with the Constitution, free 
from unlawful interference’.92 However, as Odunga J pointed out, the 
constitution is supreme and thus Parliament ‘cannot enjoy privileges, 
immunities and powers which are inconsistent with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution… Parliamentary privilege does 
not extend to violation of the Constitution [and where Parliament does 
so] the Court’s jurisdiction would not be defeated…’.93 In doing so he 
‘associated himself’ with a series of decisions from other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions
94
 and affirmed the words of Lord Denning 
in Gouriet v Union of Post Workers noted earlier ‘Be you ever so high, 
the law is above you’.  
Odunga J also addressed an argument by the respondents that 
the parliamentary committee was exercising an administrative function 
and not a quasi-judicial function. In his view, the issue for the court 
was not whether the action was described as ‘quasi-judicial’ or 
‘administrative’ but rather whether Parliament was ‘undertaking an act 
that affects the legal rights and interests of the applicant to whom the 
action related’.95 This was clearly the case here. 
As a result, Odunga J issued a declaration that the proceedings 
conducted by the appropriate parliamentary committee failed to meet 
                                                 
92
 Para III(a).  
93
 Ibid at para 81. 
94
 For example Biti v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs [2002] ZWSC 10 (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe) and Doctors for 
Life v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa). 
95
 Ibid at para 112. In doing so, the judge adopted the words of Lord 
Denning in Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175 
who emphasised that whether functions are described as judicial or 
quasi-judicial or as administrative the body still must act fairly: at 190. 
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the threshold of fair administrative action and ordered that the 
committee conduct its proceedings in strict compliance with and 
adherence to Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
 
b) The removal process 
Given the status of Auditor General and the need to avoid the 
politicisation of the decision, there is a strong case for the decision 
regarding removal being a matter for the judiciary. This is the position 
in Kenya where the President must appoint a judicial tribunal of 
enquiry which is to investigate the matter ‘expeditiously’ and must to 
make a binding recommendation upon which the President must act 
within thirty days.
96
 In Ghana, the matter is entirely removed from the 
legislature with the procedure for removal of the Auditor-General 
being the same as that of a senior judge.
97
 
Where the removal process involves the legislature, the 
approach in South Africa provides an important model. This is 
commenced by a finding by a committee of the National Assembly of 
misconduct, incapacity or incompetence on the part of the Auditor 
General. If the National Assembly then adopts by a resolution 
supported by at least two thirds of its membership calling for the 
removal from office of the Auditor General, the President must remove 
the Auditor General from office. Interestingly, the drafters of the 1996 
Constitution provided that the removal process required a simple 
                                                 
96
 The tribunal must consist of a person who holds or has held office 
as a judge of a superior court, at least two persons who are qualified 
to be appointed as High Court judges; and one other member who is 
qualified to assess the facts in respect of the particular ground for 
removal: see Article 251(5). It is required to investigate the matter 
expeditiously, report on the facts and make a binding 
recommendation to the President, who must act in accordance with the 
recommendation within thirty days. 
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 Article 187(13). 
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majority of National Assembly members only. However the 
Constitutional Court did not consider that this adequately safeguarded 
that office-holder’s independence and impartiality and the 
constitutional provision was accordingly amended to require a two-
thirds majority.
98
 Similarly, in Nigeria, the Auditor General may be 
removed from office solely by the President ‘acting on an address 
supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate’.  
 The requirement for a super-majority provides a welcome 
additional safeguard. However, the concern remains that the weakness 
of many legislatures and the dominance of the ruling party in many 
jurisdictions may inevitably result in the politicisation of the removal 
decision.  
  
PART 7: CONCLUSION  
The power of PEPs to ‘control the controls’ facilitates corrupt 
practices and misuse of public office. The challenge is to prevent the 
abuse of this power and to protect the good governance values of 
integrity, transparency and accountability enshrined in constitutions. 
This article has argued that as the ‘ally of the people’, the Auditor 
General can, and must, play a leading role through ensuring fiscal 
integrity. This has the dual purpose of both encouraging ‘ethical 
behaviour [by PEPs] by making unethical behaviour hard to accomplish 
and easy to detect’ and helping to bring to light any abuse of power.99  
As Klug neatly puts it, such an independent constitutional institution 
has ‘a distinct role in ensuring that the promises of human rights and 
                                                 
98
 See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, above 
note 28. 
99
 See note 17. 
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good governance [enshrined in the constitution] reach down into the 
daily administration of the country…’.100  
All the Constitutions noted in this study make provision for the 
office of the Auditor General and, as the examples from Zambia and 
Malawi illustrate, an effective Auditor General poses a threat to corrupt 
PEPs by ‘[flinging open] the gates to what was meant to be a 
clandestine and non-detectable criminal syndicate of fraudsters and 
money launderers’.101 Yet the cases of Chiluba and Abacha, for 
example, highlight the pressure that PEPs can exert on office-holders. 
Thus the real test is the extent to which, in practice, Auditors General 
enjoy the necessary individual and institutional independence and 
security of tenure to enable them to carry out their constitutional 
mandate effectively. This includes enjoying access to all public 
expenditure, including that relating to ‘national security’. However, 
this article has demonstrated that several of the Constitutions do not 
adequately protect the office and the office-holder and that there is a 
need to strengthen key provisions.  
Fundamentally there is a need to review the relationship 
between the Auditor General and the legislature. Retaining the close 
working relationship between the two as regards fiscal matters 
remains essential. This includes the supportive role of the legislature 
through the appropriate scrutiny and follow-up on annual audit 
reports. There is also an accountability role for the legislature which 
must also follow up any failure by the Auditor General to submit such 
reports. However, given the weakness of many legislatures, their role 
in the appointment and removal process of the Auditor General raises 
serious concerns. In most of the jurisdictions under discussion, the 
                                                 
100
 Heinz Klug ‘Accountability and the Role of Independent 
Constitutional Institutions in South Africa's Post-Apartheid 
Constitutions’ (2015-2016) 60 New York Law School Law Review 
153 at 156. 
101
 The words of Kapindu J in Republic v Lutepo see above note 25.  
  
37 
 
present constitutional arrangements arguably do not adequately 
protect the independence of the office and office-holder in practice. 
Instead it is argued that the position of the Auditor General should be 
equated to that of a senior judge including enjoying the same terms 
and conditions as regards security of tenure and removal.  
As an ‘ally of the people’ the Auditor General requires support 
from civil society organisations. The article has highlighted a range of 
opportunities for doing so, such as publicising and monitoring the 
work of the office. This includes enjoying public access to the reports 
of the Auditor General. Challenging attempts to undermine its 
operation is another key measure including, where necessary, resort to 
the courts. The TI case neatly demonstrates how effective such action 
can be and should encourage CSOs in other jurisdictions to challenge 
any attempt to restrict the work of the Auditor General.  
 To adapt Lord Denning’s words ‘Be you ever so high, the 
Constitution is above you’. The Auditor General as a constitutional 
office-holder has the power to control PEPs and thus uphold the good 
governance values enshrined in the constitution. It is hoped that the 
views expressed in this article will contribute to making this role more 
effective in practice and truly make the Auditor General the ‘ally of the 
people’.   
 
APPENDIX 
 
MEXICO DECLARATION ON SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS (SAI) 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
1. The existence of an appropriate and effective 
constitutional/statutory/legal framework and of de facto application 
provisions of this framework; 
2. The independence of SAI heads and members (of collegial 
institutions), including security of tenure and legal immunity in the 
normal discharge of their duties 
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3. A sufficiently broad mandate and full discretion, in the discharge of 
SAI functions 
4. Unrestricted access to information 
5. The right and obligation to report on their work 
6. The freedom to decide the content and timing of audit reports and 
to publish and disseminate them 
7. The existence of effective follow-up mechanisms on SAI 
recommendations 
8. Financial and managerial/administrative autonomy and the 
availability of appropriate human, material and monetary resources. 
